We present a growth model in which a non-renewable resource enters in the production function. The non-renewable resource is supposed to be sold by an external monopolistic that maximizes his intertemporal discounted cash ow. This approach allows to endogenize the price of the resource. We use the historical data of the oil price and of the oil production to calibrate the model. The forecasts of the model about the evolution of the GDP growth rate, the price and amount of the production of the oil are described.
Introduction
We present an endogenous growth model characterized by a Cobb-Douglas production function of the form y(t) = Ak (1−θ) (t)q θ (t)
where k(t) is the stock of capital at time t and q(t) is the amount of a nonrenewable resource used in the production. The non-renewability of the resource is formalized assuming that, along the evolution of the economy, the following constraint is satised (normalizing the global amount of the resource to 1):
Such a kind of approach was already introduced in the classical models like [13, 14] (see also [5] , [10] ), [12] ). In those works the planner can use freely the non-renewable resource or it is sold in a competitive market. In the recent debate (see, only as example [1] , [11] , [4] and [2] ) the optimistic positions of the seventies give way to more caution and problematic opinions about the autonomous capacity of the market of exploiting the exhaustible resources in a farsighted way.
In the simple model we present we assume that the planner of the economy has to buy the exhaustible resource from an external monopolistic (like the OPEC in the oil context). So the planner have to deal with the budget constraint y(t) = i(t) + c(t) + q(t)p(t)
where p(t) is the unit price of the non-renewable resource (chosen by the monopolistic), i(t) is the investment in new capital (so thatk(t) = i(t)) and c(t)
is the amount of consumption. We will not introduce a dynamic optimization problem solved by planner but we will assume to have a constant consumption rate (Subsection 2.3) so that c(t) = sy(t) for some s ∈ (0, 1) (or c(t) = 0 in Subsection 2.1) so the agent has only to choose i(t) and q(t). There are not strong economic arguments in favor of such an old-fashion choice but it can be accepted as the main focus of the model is on the impact of the niteness of the oil on the growth; a moderate variability of the consumption rate would not change the qualitative behavior of the economy. The choice of a constant consumption rate helps to simplify the mathematic diculties of the problems, that (it will be clearer in a while) are not trivial.
In the model the monopolistic chooses the evolution of the price p(t) in order to maximize the intertemporal discounted cash ow
(t)q(t) dt
where ρ is a strictly positive constant and q(t) is determined by demand-side.
Once the monopolistic has chosen the evolution of the price p(t) ≥ 0 for t ≥ 0 the dynamics of the economy is uniquely determined (thanks to equation (8) and (4)). In particular once the monopolistic has xed p(t) for all t ≥ 0 we have the evolution of q(t) for all t ≥ 0 and we can verify if such a q(t) satisfy (1). We will say that an evolution of the price p(t) is admissible if the related q(t) satises (1).
So the optimization problem of the monopolistic is to nd a price evolution that, together with the relate q(t), maximize the discounted cash ow among the exponential admissible evolutions.
Once the optimization problem is solved we have: the evolution of the price p(t) for t ≥ 0, the related function q(t) that describe the amount of the sold non-renewable resources for t ≥ 0 and the evolution of the production y(t).
It is easy to see that we can reduce the maximization problem of nding the maximum among the trajectories that satisfy (1) to that of nding the maximum among the trajectories on the boundary an then using the constraint (10).
The exponential case In the study of the model we will rst give a general result (Proposition 3.1) that roughly speaking states that, as we aspect, all the admissible evolutions of the (real) price grow to innity for t that goes to innity:
there do not exist admissible evolutions of the (real) price that remain bounded.
We then focus to a particular class of admissible price: the exponential case. So we assume that p(t) = p 0 e ωt for some p 0 > 0 and ω > 0.
Proposition 3.2 shows that for every ω there exists a unique p 0 such that the evolution of the price p(t) = p 0 e ωt is admissible (that is the related evolution of q(t) satises (10)). Proposition 3.4 states that (given the positive constants A, θ, k 0 , s and ρ) there exists an admissible exponential strategy that maximizes the functional among the set of all the admissible exponential strategy.
The choice of the exponential case is mainly due to a technical reason and it can be seen as analogous to the study of the balance growth paths in a neoclassical growth model. Note that, even though the evolution of the price is exponential along the exponential strategy (by denition) the evolution of y(t) and q(t) is more complex.
Calibration and simulation In Section 4 and Section 5 we will focus our attention on the oil case: we will calibrate and use of the model. The model allows to endogenize the evolution of the price and so we can calibrate it using the price and the amount of production of the oil. They are surely more reliable data than the evaluations of the dierent countries about the remaining availability of the oil.
The model allows a choice of A, θ, ρ and k 0 such that the optimal exponential strategy ts quite precisely with historical series of the price of the oil, with the historical series of the oil supply and with the growth rate of the global GDP (see Figure 2 , Figure 3 and Figure 4 ). In Section 5 we look at the predictions of the calibrated model. We show the forecasted evolution of the oil production ( Figure 5 ) and of the GDP growth rate ( Figure 6 ). The evolution of the oil production has a maximum in the 2008 and then begin to decrease. On the other hand the forecasted evolution of the growth rate of the production is only slightly decreasing. So, in the model, the economy continues to maintain an high growth rate of the production also if the price of the oil strongly grows and the production of the oil reduces. This actually is in line with the macroeconomic data of the last years (see Section 5 on this point). Of course this is only a simple model and the predictions are only qualitative, in particular the forecasts can be signicant only in a not too long interval of time in which we can assume constant the technology and the oil-dependency of the economy (that are modeled by the constants A and θ).
For other remarks on the results see Section 5.
In Figure 7 we represent the prediction of the evolution of the oil sold on the market in the period 1990-2100. It is a very long period of time but we chose to show all the qualitative behavior of the oil production predicted by the model (it is a way to describe the model more than the reality). As discussed in Section 5, the represented curve cannot be considered as an endogenous version of the Hubbert curve (see for example [3] ). The phenomenon we represent has some similarities and some relevant dierences with a Hubbert curve: both are due to the niteness of the oil and they have a similar shape but while a Hubbert peak of the oil has a physical and geological reasons here the reason of the decrease of the oil supply is an eect of merely economic considerations: the monopolistic chooses to gradually decrease the oil supply because this is the most protable strategy.
Other comments and observations on the results and on the simulations are in Section 5.
2 The model
2.1
The demand-side
We assume to have a Cobb Douglas production function, with constant returns to scale, in the two factors k(t) (stock of capital at time t) and q(t) (the amount of the exhaustible resource used in the production at time t)
where A is a positive constant and θ ∈ (0, 1). The agent has to choose at each time how to split the production among investment in new capital, consumption and exhaustible resource:
where i(t) and c(t) are the amount of investment in new capital and the consumption at time t, q(t)p(t) is the cost for the non-renewable resource (being p(t) the unit price of the resource). The demand side is price taker, q(t) is adjusted in order to maximize y(t) − p(t)q(t). So the rst order condition gives
We impose, as in the common neoclassical models, the dynamic of the capital accumulation to bek (t) = i(t), (5) some depreciation factor can be included in A. As already announced we choose to ignore the dynamics of the consumption and to consider c(t) = 0, in Subsection 2.3 we will see how this approach covers the more general case of a constant consumption rate c(t) = sy(t).
From (2), (3) and (5) we havė
Using (4) we havė
, that we will assume to be positive, we can writek
Eventually, if k 0 > 0 is the stock of capital at time 0 we have −ρt p(t)q(t) dt (9) subject to (4) and (5), among the trajectories that are admissible in sense that
Equation (10) models the niteness of the resource: a monopolistic strategy for the price p(t) is admissible if the related trajectory for the amount of the sold resource q(t), obtained replacing p(t) in (5) and (4), satises (10).
To be more formal, given a
we call k p (t) the related (continuous) solution of (8) and q p (t) the (measurable) expression given by (4) and we dene the set of the admissible evolutions of the price as:
We normalize the global amount of the resource to 1.
2.3
The constant consumption rate case
We could introduce a consumption c(t) in the economy and impose the resource constraint y(t) = i(t) + c(t) + q(t)p(t).
instead of (3). If we consider a generic consumption c(t) the model becomes hardly treatable (we would need to introduce another functional to model the decisions of the planner). Anyway we can observe that the setting we used allow to treat the case of an exogenous constant consumption rate so that c(t) = sy(t) the problem would bė
1 The right notation should be J(p(·)) since J is a functional that associates to the function p(·) a real number, but we will write, using a imprecise but diuse notation, p(t) to mean both the function p(·) and its value at point t.
2 As we observed in the introduction we can substitute the constraint
loc ([0, +∞)) the set of the locally integrable function (that is the set of the
the set of the set of the locally integrable function that are positive.
Eventually we would obtain B = Ã 1
that is the same of (5) with a dierent value for the B. So the problem with a constant consumption rate can be studied exactly in the same way. 3 The study of the model Using (4) and (8) we can write (10) as
Such an expression can be dicultly treat in the general case anyway note that Proposition 3.1. If p(t) ∈ A then sup t∈[0,∞) p(t) = +∞. Moreover, if we call µ the Lebesgue measure on R, for every M > 0 we have that µ {t ∈ [0, +∞) :
Proof. We can argue by contradiction: suppose that there exists a p(t) ∈ A and M > 0 s.t., if we dene
and so we have the contradiction (if p ∈ A by denition q p = 1 = +∞) and the claim.
3.1
The exponential case So Proposition 3.1 states, roughly speaking, that the price has to grow to innity, moreover it could be also proven that light growths of the prices are not enough: for example it can be proven that linear evolutions of the price cannot be admissible strategy.
We reduce here the study of the optimal strategy for the exhaustible resource price only among the set of the exponential strategy. This is of course a restriction of the problem presented in (9) and (10) and this kind of study is mainly due to technical reasons. This kind of approach is an analogous of studying of the BGPs for a neoclassical growth model.
We consider a price of the form p(t) = p 0 e ωt , we dene
A strategy of U to be admissible has to satisfy the (10) that in our case can be expressed as (11) . 
We also have
Proof. In the proof we will rst introduce β and then I, we reversed the order in the statement to make it clearer.
In (13) we can express p0 θA
in terms of β as So we can rewrite (13) only in terms of ω and β. It becomes:
This relation, since both β → e β and β → W (β) are positive and strictly growing and ω →
is a strictly growing function that holds 0 in 0 has limit +∞ for ω → ∞, ensure that for every ω there exists a unique β =β(ω) satisfying (19), that ω →β(ω) is strictly decreasing and satisfỹ β(ω)
Thanks to the expression ofβ(·, ·) given in (15) we can easily see that for given ω and β there exists a unique p 0 = I(ω) satisfying β =β(ω, p 0 ). We have of courseβ(ω) =β(ω, I(ω)) and so (16) and (17) follow from (20). To see that ω → I(ω) is a strictly decreasing function we have only to observe that (ω, p 0 , t) → p(t) = p 0 e ωt is, for every t > 0 a strictly increasing function in ω and p 0 , so, thanks to the expression for the capital (8) the amount of capital at time t is strictly decreasing in ω and p 0 , and, thanks to (4) we nally see that q(t) (for every t > 0) is strictly decreasing in ω and p 0 , so (referring to the initial formulation of the constraint (10) we have the claim.
To prove the (18) we can consider (13): Remark 3.3. We have proven that for every ω we can nd a positive p 0 = I(ω) such that (13) is satised. The opposite is not true. Namely there can exist some p 0 > 0 (in particular some too small p 0 ) such that there does not exist any ω > 0 such that p 0 = I(ω).
So we dene now a subset of U given by the admissible strategies, that is the strategies satisfying (13): 
Proof. To prove the statement we consider the value of the functional (9) on a trajectories of U ad p(t) = I(ω)e ωt for ω > 0. We write J(ω) for J(I(ω)e ωt ) and we call p ω and q ω the trajectories of the price of the oil and of the quantity of the oil related to the price p(t) = I(ω)e ωt . So
We show now that J(ω) (4) and (8))
Bpω(s)
(since we are considering ω → ∞ we can assume, for (18), that Bp
that goes to zero for the dominate convergence theorem when ω → 0 + thanks to (from 18).
Otherwise when ω → +∞ we have, thanks to (4), (8)
but the last integral, thank to (17) goes to 0 for ω → ∞.
Remark 3.5. It is natural to wonder whether we have the uniqueness of the minimum. In the simulations the minimum always happened to be unique but we cannot prove formally this fact at this step.
A numerical example We consider the set of parameters described in Table   ( The maximum of J(ω) is obtained inω = 4, 91% and the related p 0 (ω) = I(ω) is 24.6$.
Calibration of the model
In the model the total amount of the oil is normalized to 1. This is generic normalization factor that is of course inconsistent if we want for example to measure the amount of the oil in barrels (the oil is scarce but not so much!). As a consequence, when we calibrate the model we cannot aspect that the scaling parameters A and k 0 have realistic value and we will be indeed interested mainly in proportions and rates.
Nevertheless we can choose a variable to have a value consistent with the real data, we will choose to calibrate the model to obtain an acceptable value for the price of the oil (dollars a barrel). We will also calibrate the model w.r.t the growth rate of the oil supply and the growth rate of the GDP.
To calibrate the model we have chosen the period 1990-2007. The choice of the period is quite problematic, indeed the short run variations in the oil price have mainly political and nancial reasons. So the interval we use to calibrate the model has to be large enough to show an underlying long run behavior due to economic factors. On the other hand the period we consider cannot be too long because in the model the technology and the oil-dependency of the economy (that era modeled by A and θ) are constant.
We have chosen to exclude in the calibration the pick in the oil price of the late-seventies/early eighties. Nevertheless in the early nineties the price of the oil is strongly inuenced by the rst Gulf War with a pick in the price in the 1990-1991 and a period of unnatural low prices that continues until the end of the nineties. We considered these facts tting the data. Of course focusing of the data following the 1990-1991 has also the meaning of avoid the data of the two blocs age, in which the economical and political situation was completely dierent from those of today.
We use the set of parameters of Table 1 . 
Outlook and conclusions
In this section we present some forecasts that arise from our approach. We use the calibration presented in Section 4 (that is the set of parameters of Table   7 Using the le GRAPHS_price_and_quantity.m. the oil production is obtained using the expression of the predicted oil price in (8) and then in (4). In Figure 6 we represent the forecasted GDP growth rate, obtained using the evolution of the oil production and of the capital in production function (2) and then computing the growth rate. Of course this is only a simple model and the predictions are only qualitative.
The period [2005] [2006] [2007] The data of the last quarters are of particular interest. These are the EIA data, see [8] and [7] , the prices are in dollars of the We also add (same source: [8] ) that the average total oil production in These data seem to outline a new scenario. Indeed in the past (at least from the late eighties) reductions in oil production corresponded to periods of low GDP growth and, usually, to a reduction in the oil price. While a reduction (or constant trend) of the oil in a period of low-growing GDP and a decreasing oil price suggests a reduction of the demand of oil, a reduction (or constant trend) of the oil in a period of high-growing GDP and a increasing oil price is an unambiguous sign that something happening on the supply side. The model we present suggest the economic mechanism that underly to such a behavior.
Using the calibration we have suggested, the maximum of the oil production is Anyway such a result is completely in line with the recent macroeconomic data:
we live in a period of high price of the oil and strong growth of the global GDP.
Of course it is a qualitative behavior that does not consider the business cycle or the political events, but it anyway suggests the qualitative contribution of the niteness of a non-renewable resource, as the oil, in the growth rate. As we have already stressed the model considers a constant dependency of the economy on the oil and so we can aspect that, if there will be enough investments in the research of new technology less dependent on the use of the oil, the qualitative decrease of the growth rate predicted by the model will be stopped.
A non-Hubbert peak In Figure 7 we represent the behavior of the oil production in the period 1990-2100 predicted by the model. This of course is a very long period but we chose to present the whole picture to show the qualitative behaviour suggested by the model. The oil production has a maximum in 2008 Figure 7 : The supply forecasted in the period 1990-2100
and then begins to decrease. As already observed in the introduction it cannot be considered an Hubbert peak. The two phenomena are of course connected, indeed both arise from the observation that the oil is a non-renewable resource, and then the extraction cannot increase forever.
14 The dierence is given by the dierent reason that generates the peak. While in the Hubbert model the decrease in the production (extraction) of the oil is mainly due to physical and geological reasons (the extraction of the oil decreases because the oil wells have less pressure and give a fewer amount of oil) here the decrease if a free choice of the monopolistic: he could extract more oil but he do not want to. He increase and then decrease the oil supply because this is the most protable strategy.
Note also that while we can speck of Hubbert peak also locally (many oil wells have reached their Hubbert peak and many have been exhausted) we can have the phenomenon we model only globally.
